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The Information Content of Quarterly Earnings in 
Syndicated Bank Loan Prices 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We examine the information content of quarterly earnings announcements in the  
syndicated bank loan market, a hybrid public/private debt market that is exclusively 
comprised of informed institutional participants.  In contrast to the literature on equity 
price reactions to earnings announcements, we find that bank loan returns experience no 
significant response on earnings announcement dates. However, we do find significant 
price movements in the secondary loan market four weeks prior to earnings 
announcement dates, around the time of the monthly covenant reports to members of the 
syndicate. Moreover, we find that the information content in syndicated bank loan prices 
is most pronounced for borrowers with predominantly intangible assets that experience 
declining earnings.  Thus, we find evidence that when earnings announcements convey 
relevant information about the borrowing firm (i.e., for informationally opaque firms with 
declining creditworthiness), the syndicated bank loan market expeditiously incorporates 
that information into prices. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we examine the information content in earnings as reflected in 
changes in the prices to the holders of syndicated bank loans. We find no evidence that, at 
the time of the release of the earnings, there is any change in these  private debt holders’ 
perception of future cash flows, as reflected in a change in secondary bank loan prices at 
the time of the quarterly earnings announcements. However, when we examine the 
change in secondary bank loan prices from a period starting five weeks before the 
quarterly earnings announcement, around the time of the monthly covenant reports to all 
members of the syndicate, we find that there is a statistically significant decline in prices 
for those firms that are about to announce a decline in earnings. There is no similar effect 
for firms that are about to announce earnings increases. We interpret this finding to be 
consistent with the belief that holders of bank loans are able to more closely monitor the 
financial activities of the firm and so any information that might adversely affect the 
prospects of future loan repayments is expeditiously reflected in loan prices in the 
secondary bank loan market.  Thus, participants in the syndicated bank loan market need 
not wait for the release of quarterly earnings in order to incorporate the information 
contained therein into loan prices. 
The information content associated with the release of annual and quarterly 
earnings announcements has been extensively studied (see Bernard, 1989 and Kothari, 
2001 for comprehensive reviews of this topic). The evidence is overwhelming that equity 
holders use earnings announcements to update their perceptions about the future cash 
flows of the firm. For a variety of institutional reasons, namely the lack of publicly 
available data and infrequency of trades, there is much less empirical evidence examining 
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the impact of earnings announcements on debt prices. Even though debt makes up a 
substantial part of a firm’s capital structure, the difficulties in getting unique prices and 
infrequent trading have limited the number of empirical studies.1  
Within the debt market, we loosely categorize debt into those issues where the 
Securities and Exchange Commission mandates a public prospectus, namely public debt, 
and debt where a prospectus is not required, namely private debt. We surmise that public 
debt holders have access to the same set of information, as do public equity holders, thus 
bondholders have incentives to utilize the information contained in earnings 
announcements.  However, firm information flows differently to the private debt 
markets.2  In this paper, we concentrate on the informativeness of quarterly earnings 
announcements to a portion of the private debt market referred to as the syndicated bank 
loan market.  
We set out to investigate whether and when the secondary, or syndicated bank 
loan prices reflect information in  quarterly earnings.  Since these lenders may receive 
monthly covenant reports from borrowers reporting detailed financial and accounting 
information, the secondary market of syndicate loans has the opportunity to incorporate 
such information into the price at the time the monthly reports are released as well as at 
the time that quarterly earnings are announced.   We further hypothesize that since 
lenders are exposed to downside losses, but do not share in upside gains (beyond the 
contractual repayment of interest and principal), it is conceivable that the loan market 
would be more sensitive to negative earnings information than to positive earnings 
                                                 
1 A noted exception to this general rule is Hanjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) that examines the impact of 
dividend announcements on public bondholder wealth. Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) find that both equity 
and publicly-held bonds respond equally efficiently to information about earnings.  
2 For a discussion of bank loans as privately placed debt, see Carey, Post and Sharpe (1998). 
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information. Therefore, we expect an asymmetric price reaction in the secondary loan 
market.    
We examine 11,034 quoted prices for syndicated loans from 196 firms for 2,127 
quarterly earnings announcements over the period consisting of the last quarter of 1998 
to December 2002. We utilize the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC) marked-to-market 
dataset that contains weekly quotes on syndicated loans from various dealers in the 
secondary loan market.  Using this database, we observe loan price changes prior to the 
announcement of each borrower’s quarterly earnings releases, after controlling for 
relevant firm and loan characteristics that are expected to affect the impact of 
information about quarterly earnings announcements on loan returns.  In general, we fail 
to find any price movements in the secondary loan market at the time of the release of 
the quarterly earnings announcement; that is, bank loan returns experience no significant 
price response at the time of the earnings announcement. However, we do find 
significant price movements in the secondary loan market approximately four weeks 
prior to earnings announcement dates, around the time of the monthly covenant reports 
to members of the syndicate.   
We also show that the information leakage regarding upcoming quarterly 
earnings is asymmetric between good and bad news firms during the pre-announcement 
period. Bad news about earnings (i.e., declining earnings) is incorporated into bank loan 
prices as early as five weeks prior to the earnings announcement date, with the most 
significant movement occurs at four weeks prior to announcement.  However, good news 
does not move prices as dramatically. These findings are consistent with the nature of the 
debt contract, which exposes the lenders to downside risk but shares no upside gains.   
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Finally, we find that the information content in syndicated bank loan prices is 
most pronounced for borrowers with predominantly intangible assets that experience 
declining earnings. These intangible firms are the most informationally opaque, and thus 
earnings information can be expected to convey the most information about the value of 
the firm’s assets and the prospects for loan repayment.  In contrast, earnings information 
would be less important in valuing loans issued by firms with tangible, hard assets that 
can be easily valued.  Thus, we find evidence that when earnings announcements convey 
relevant information about the borrowing firm (i.e., when the borrower has intangible 
assets and declining creditworthiness), the syndicated bank loan market expeditiously 
incorporates that information into prices. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the secondary 
loan market and describes our data source. Section 3 develops our hypotheses.  We 
discuss our regression model, variable measurement, summary statistics and the empirical 
results analyzing the information content of quarterly earnings in Section 4.  Finally, 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Secondary Market in Syndicated Bank Loans 
Large bank loans are often underwritten by syndicates of bank and non-bank 
financial intermediaries, led by a lead arranger or agent bank that organizes the syndicate 
and negotiates the loan terms. Bank loans tend to have unique characteristics.  There is a 
large body of academic literature (see Boot, 2000) hypothesizing that “banks may know 
more about a company’s prospects than other investors do,”3 thereby suggesting that 
banks have an information advantage in providing financing for firms. This stems from 
                                                 
3 See James (1987). 
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their roles as delegated monitors, cultivated in the course of long-term banking 
relationships that include provision of a myriad of deposit, cash-management and lending 
services.4  Moreover, bank loans are easier to renegotiate and restructure in the event of 
the firm’s financial distress than are publicly traded debt instruments that typically have 
hundreds or thousands of uncoordinated bondholders that find it hard to reach agreement, 
at times required to be unanimous.5  Thus, bank loans offer a certain amount of flexibility 
that is unavailable to issuers of bonds and other publicly traded debt securities.   
Syndicated bank loans can be viewed as a hybrid between public and private debt 
markets (see, for example, Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000). Oldham (1998) and Miller 
(1998) show that syndicated bank loans trade like bonds, with fully developed 
securitization tools, ratings, and a broad institutional investor base.  However, the 
syndicated bank loan market can also be viewed as a private debt market.  Syndicates are 
formed by lead arranging banks that typically have had a lending relationship with the 
borrower.  Moreover, the covenant structure may entitle all members of the syndicate to 
the receipt of monthly financial updates detailing accounting data such as EBITDA, debt 
levels, free cash flows and net worth.  Thus, syndicate members receive considerable 
amounts of private information about the financial condition of the borrower.  Altman, 
Gande and Saunders (2003) find that the bank loan market is informationally more 
efficient than the bond market in terms of incorporating default information into prices. 
Casolaro, Focarelli and Pizzolo (2003) examine loan spreads and find that the percentage 
                                                 
4 That is, banks obtain private information about their customers by observing a history of customer 
information such as the flow of funds through customer checking accounts, past repayment history, 
customer use of commercial banking products (such as letters of credit), firm hedging activities, etc. 
5 In the life cycle hypothesis, firms progress from private sources of funds (including bank loans), to 
publicly traded debt and equity as they grow and become more well-known to the market. Moreover, Denis 
and Mihov (2003) find that firms with the highest credit quality issue publicly-traded bonds, whereas less 
creditworthy firms rely more on the private debt market. 
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of the syndication held by the lead arranging bank is an important determinant of the 
information produced in the course of monitoring the activities of the borrower, 
suggesting that banks certify the quality of the loan by holding larger stakes.  However, 
Allen and Gottesman (2004) find that when equity markets are relatively illiquid, equity 
markets are more informationally efficient than loan markets. 
The Wall Street Journal (October 29, 2001) referred to the syndicated loan market 
as a “multi-trillion dollar debt bazaar that has become the nation’s largest capital market 
during the last decade.”6  Many factors contributed to the rapid growth in the syndicated 
loan market during the 1990s.  The advent of Rule 144a in 1990 (for a discussion of this 
rule, see Press and Weintrop, 1999) permitted the resale of privately-held securities.  
Moreover, the 1991-1992 credit crunch, exacerbated by the adoption of more stringent, 
risk-based international bank capital requirements, contributed to the banking system’s 
willingness to sell their loans into the secondary market, rather than hold them until 
maturity.  Liquidity in the market was bolstered by the founding of the Loan Syndication 
and Trading Association (LSTA) and the adoption of standardized T+10 settlement 
procedures for par and near par loans.  Thomas and Wang (2004) demonstrate that the 
leveraged loan market has been integrated into the high yield debt market since 1994, 
suggesting that the same factors that impact junk bond prices also impact leveraged loan 
prices.7 
2.1 The Loan Pricing Corporation Database and Sample Selection 
 Our major database is obtained from the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC) and 
consists of two components: the marked-to-market database and Dealscan.  The marked-
                                                 
6 Zuckerman and Sapsford, (2001). 
7 Leveraged loans are non-investment grade loans made to highly leveraged borrowers.  They are priced at 
spreads that exceed 200 basis points over LIBOR. 
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to-market database consists of weekly loan bid and ask quotations for individual loan 
facilities.8   Loan deals are typically broken into individual facilities.  Each facility 
represents a different tranche of the total loan.  The facilities may differ in terms of their 
covenants, structure (revolving versus term loans), maturity, spreads, etc. For each 
individual facility, LPC provides an average of all available bids and an average of all 
available asks, and the mean of the average bid and the average ask (denoted mean of 
mean quote), as well as the number of quotes that comprise the composite average. 
Transaction prices are not available in the syndicated bank loan market.  However, 
internal LPC studies suggest that transactions prices for par loans (priced above 90) are 
close to the mean of the mean bid and mean ask quotes (hereinafter, denoted the LPC 
mean of the mean).  Thus, we use the LPC mean of the mean to determine the value of a 
particular loan facility, denoted Pit  for any given borrower i in any given week t.   
We coordinate the marked-to-market database with loan descriptive data provided 
on LPC’s Dealscan database of primary market data.9  The Dealscan database contains 
detailed data about the borrower, the lending syndicate and the terms of the loan itself 
(including financial and general covenants, optionality in pricing, amorization schedules, 
lending purpose, etc.).  After combining the two databases, we obtain a sample consisting 
of 1,639 unique loan facilities with 249 variables describing the terms of the loan facility, 
the borrower, the lenders, the composition of the syndicate and the pricing of the loan 
weekly over the June 1998 through May 2003 period.  
                                                 
8 LPC is a data warehouser, collecting daily price quotes from more than 30 dealers in the syndicated bank 
loan market and making them available for use in the marked-to-market database.  We acquired a limited 
version of this database that includes weekly price quotations over the period of June 1998 to June 2003.  
Moreover, our observations are limited to those loan facilities with at least two quoting dealers.  Our full 
database contains 184,710 facility prices. 
9 See Dichev and Skinner (2002) for a discussion of the database. 
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We combine the LPC databases with quarterly Compustat data in order to obtain 
financial information about earnings, size and leverage.  Imposing the requirement of 
Compustat data availability further limited our sample to 878 loan facilities.  In order for 
a firm to remain in the sample, we choose those firms in the combined LPC database with 
quarterly earnings announcements from Compustat, subject to the following criteria: 
1. Each facility must have at least 25 time-series observations of quoted loan prices. 
2. Only one facility per firm was selected to avoid interdependence among realized 
returns. The facility that was chosen has the longest time-series observations of 
quoted prices, i.e., it is the most frequently “traded” facility to reduce the 
infrequent “trading” problem associated with private debt.  
 
3. There had to be at least one year of quarterly earnings announcement dates 
available from Compustat during the time period of the loan trades. 
 
4.   For each of the earnings announcements there had to be at least two quoted prices  
      within our –6 week to +6 week return window, with 0 being the week of the  
      announcement. 
 
5. The weekly return on a leveraged loan index (the S&P/LSTA loan index) is 
available.  
 
 The selection process yields 11,163 firm-quarter observations. To control for the 
effects of extreme values, we remove those observations that are identified as outliers in 
the regressions.10 We report our tests in the paper based on our final sample of 11,034 
firm-quarter observations. 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
10 To control for outliers, we remove from all of our tests any observation that has a studentized residual 
greater than four standard deviations from zero in any pooled regression of loan returns on change in 
quarterly earnings.  There were only 129 observations that were removed from the analysis as outliers.  
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3. Hypotheses Development 
3.1 The Timing of the Price Reaction to Earnings Announcements 
There is a voluminous literature in both accounting and finance dating back to 
Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) that deals with the market’s response to 
earnings announcements. The persistence of this finding is documented in Landsman and 
Maydew (2002). They find no evidence of a decline in the information content of 
earnings announcements over the past three decades.  Indeed, they find an increase in the 
informativeness of earnings announcements over time, as measured by abnormal stock 
price volatility and abnormal trading volume.   
Since both debt and equity represent claims on the firm’s assets, any change in 
investors’ expectations of future cash flows will influence the pricing of debt, as well as 
equity, securities. Thus one could hypothesize that a similar earnings announcement 
effect would be reflected in debt prices as is found in equity prices. In a paper that tests 
the information content in public debt prices at the time of annual earnings 
announcements, Davis, Boatsman and Baskin (1978) find that there is an association 
between the price of public debt and the announcement of annual earnings.11  Our 
hypotheses are designed to test whether the results of the extant literature demonstrating 
earnings announcement effects in equity and public debt markets apply to syndicated 
bank loan markets. 
 
                                                 
11  In a related paper, Hanjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) examine the information content in public debt and 
equity prices at the time of dividend changes. The main thrust of their paper is to distinguish the 
information content hypothesis from a wealth transfer hypothesis. This suggests that the change in dividend 
policy effectively transfers wealth from the debt to the equity holders when dividends are increased. The 
authors find no support for the wealth transfer hypothesis, but do find support for the information content 
hypothesis. 
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H1:  Information about quarterly corporate earnings is reflected in bank loan prices 
on announcement dates. 
 In testing this hypothesis, we examine whether the results that are prevalent in the 
equity market literature showing significant announcement date reactions to earnings, 
hold for the syndicated bank loan market.  A finding in support of H1 would suggest that 
bank loan returns and equity returns have similar reactions to earnings announcements.  
However, there are several reasons why bank loan prices may react differently to 
earnings announcements than do equity prices, thereby leading to a rejection of H1. 
At the heart of most of the studies of equity market reaction to earnings 
announcements is the assumption that the release of important data about the firm, such 
as earnings, is made available to all investors at the same time.12 However, investors in 
different markets may be the recipients of different types of information flows. The 
different flows could be a result of the efforts (costs) that particular investors are willing 
to incur in order to obtain data. In particular, private debt markets, such as the syndicated 
bank loan market, require the periodic transfer of data on the borrowing firm’s economic 
prospects such as future earnings and cash flows.  If this information has is useful in 
evaluating the firm’s debt claims, we would expect to see a response in bank loan prices 
to the release of this information would precede the earnings announcement date.  
Because private debt markets may have access to different sources of information at 
different points in time, we may, therefore, observe different responses to information 
about corporate earnings in the syndicated bank loan market as compared to the public 
equity and debt markets.  For example, Altman, Gande and Saunders (2003) compare the 
                                                 
12 Jorgensen and Wingender (2004) find that quarterly earnings announcements are disseminated broadly to 
public markets via telephone and the Internet, particularly in the wake of the passage of Regulation FD in 
October 2000. 
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information content of trading in the syndicated bank loan market to the publicly-held 
bond market and find that the syndicated bank loan market is more informationally 
efficient than the market for publicly traded bonds.   
A further difference in any reaction to information about the future cash flows of 
the firm relates to potential differences in the way that holders of debt versus equity 
respond to the same information.  That is, debt and equity prices may respond differently 
to the same information.  If, for example, the information reflects an increase in a firm’s 
asset values, then both its debt and equity prices will tend to increase.  However, if the 
information reflects an increase in the volatility of asset values, all else being equal, then 
debt prices will decline whereas equity prices will increase.  The negative correlation of 
debt and equity prices to asset volatility stems from the short put option nature of debt 
(that is, debt holders issue a put option on the firm’s assets to equity holders) as 
compared to the call option qualities of equity.  Thus, ceteris paribus, debt values decline 
(increase) when volatility increases (decreases), whereas equity values increase 
(decrease) when volatility increases (decreases). Another reason why we might expect a 
differential informational impact of earnings announcements on debt prices as compared 
to equity prices is the market’s differing informational efficiency.  Although Blume, 
Keim and Patel (1991) and Cornell and Green (1991) find a strong contemporaneous 
relationship between bond returns and stock returns, Kwan (1996) suggests that stock 
markets are more informationally efficient than are bond markets.  
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3.2 Asymmetric Responses to Information About Earnings   
Prior literature has posited that there may be an asymmetric price response 
between news that reveals a firm’s deteriorating future economic prospects as compared 
to the price reaction to news that reveals a firm’s rosy future economic prospects (Hayn, 
1995). However, extant equity-based research provides mixed findings on this issue. For 
example, by regressing raw returns on firm earnings, Hayn (1995) finds that the earnings-
returns relation is much stronger for profitable firm-years than when all firm-years are 
included. However, Chambers (1996) reports that when sample firms are size-matched, 
firms with declining earnings tend to have a higher R2 than do firms with increasing 
earnings. In replicating the tests of Hayn (1995) using inter-announcement period market-
adjusted returns, Basu (1997) finds that the earnings-returns relation is stronger for the 
full sample than for increasing earnings firms only. He interprets his results to be 
consistent with the conservatism in accounting as bad news regarding future cash flows is 
recognized in earnings in a more timely manner than is good news.  Similar findings can 
be found in examining the stock market reactions to bond rating changes. For example, 
Holthausan and Leftwich (1986) find significant abnormal stock returns associated with 
bond downgradings, but not with upgradings. Moreover, Handjinicolaou and Kalay 
(1984) find that gains associated with positive dividend announcements are captured by 
the stockholders (and not the bondholders), while the losses resulting from negative 
dividend announcements are shared with the bondholders. Therefore, we test the 
following null hypothesis: 
H2: The information content of earnings in the syndicated loan market is 
symmetric, such that firms that have releases of data indicating positive future prospects 
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realize the same market reaction as do firms that release data indicating negative future 
prospects. 
From a creditor’s point of view, timely information about “bad news” is more 
important than information about “good news,” since the value of creditors’ claims on a 
firm’s assets is more sensitive to a decline than an increase in the firm’s future economic 
prospects (Smith, 1979). Due to the nature of the debt contract, lenders are exposed to 
downside losses, but do not share in upside gains (beyond the contractual repayment of 
interest and principal). Therefore, we expect the information content of earnings in the 
secondary syndicated loan market to be asymmetric between firms that release earnings 
indicating negative future economic prospects (denoted, bad news) and those announcing 
increasing earnings (denoted, good news). More specifically, we expect syndicated loan 
returns to be more sensitive to bad news than to good news, thereby rejecting H2. 
 
3.3 The Impact of Earnings Information For R&D Intensive Firms   
Our last hypothesis relates to the source of firm financing. Firms obtain financing 
from many sources – issuance of equity, preferred stock, (straight and convertible) bonds 
and other debt instruments, including loans from banks.  Informationally opaque firms 
are likely to rely on bank loans for a portion of their sources of financing in order to 
benefit from the monitoring activities of the bank lender, as well as to obtain potential 
signaling advantages associated with loan approvals.13  Diamond (1991) shows that 
borrowers tend to move from private resources to the public debt market when the quality 
of the firm’s information improves.  Pennachi (1988) demonstrates that when the benefits 
of sellers’ monitoring of the loan become negligible, a loan can be sold in its entirety.  
                                                 
13 See James (1987) and Dahiya, Puri and Saunders (2004).  
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This is true for firms that are less informationally opaque, and therefore, can be evaluated 
using public information by arms-length investors.   
In contrast, firms with large amounts of intangible assets are difficult for public 
capital markets to evaluate and monitor.  With their relative paucity of hard assets and the 
proliferation of growth opportunities and other intangible assets on their balance sheets, 
intangible firms may be rationed out of public capital markets because of the potential for 
extreme moral hazard risk shifting resulting from information asymmetries.  Often 
private debt, such as the bank loans and venture capital, are the only sources of capital 
available to these firms.  Houston and James (1996) show that private debt represents 
83% of outstanding corporate debt in their sample, with the majority of firms in their 
sample relying exclusively on private debt.   
It is for intangible firms, however, that information is simultaneously most critical 
and least available.  Thus, we hypothesize that the information content of accounting 
earnings is larger for firms in which intangibles comprise a large proportion of their 
assets. This is often reflected in R&D intensive industries. Following Barron et al. 
(2002), we define R&D intensive firms to be high-technology manufacturing firms. The 
central characteristics of these R&D intensive firms is that they develop most of their 
intangibles (e.g., R&D) internally, and yet according to the current accounting standards, 
these intangibles have to be fully expensed, rather than capitalized on the balance sheet. 
Compared with capitalization, full expensing of these R&D expenditures implies a higher 
uncertainty regarding whether and when the future economic benefits from these 
expenditures can be realized, which gives rise to the “opaqueness” of their financial 
information. This leads us to our last hypothesis. 
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H3: The information content of earnings in the syndicated loan market is the same for 
R&D intensive firms as for other firms.   
The highly uncertain nature of intangibles, combined with the accounting 
treatment for these internally developed intangibles, makes it more difficult to observe 
and interpret the financial information for R&D intensive firms. Accordingly, the demand 
for timely information about these firms is larger, and so is the information content of 
accounting earnings.  Thus we expect to reject H3. 
 
4.  The Empirical Model and Results  
4.1 Variable Definitions 
4.1.1    Loan Returns and Index Loan Returns 
To test the hypotheses described in section 3, we define the following variables.   
The dependent variable in our event study, Rit, is the weekly return on each individual 
syndicated bank loan facility. We use weekly (mean of the mean) quotations obtained 
from LPC to obtain syndicated bank loan prices and calculate the raw return by taking the 
log difference of two consecutive weekly quotes. More specifically, our dependent 
variable R,it is measured by the following: 
Rit = Ln (Pit /Pit-1)     (1) 
where 
Rit = the rate of return of syndicated loan facility i between the closing quote at week t-1  
         to the closing quote at week t, 
 Pit = quoted LPC mean of the mean price of loan facility i at week t.  
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The calculation of holding period returns, Rit, is complicated by several factors.   
First, the weekly quotes may not be consecutive. If the weekly quotes are not 
consecutive, we denote the weeks of missing quotes as missing observations, i.e., we 
don’t replace missing consecutive returns with multi-week returns.14  Second, the dates 
for which these quotes are available change across loan facilities, and even over time for 
the same loan facility. To correctly locate each quote in terms of its distance to each 
earnings announcement date, we designed the following methodology:    
         
1. Let Wis be the first day of the week during which quarterly earnings for firm i are 
announced, 
 
2. Let N be the distance in terms of weeks from the observed date of quote in week t 
of loan facility i to Wis, 
 
3. Let K be the integer of N, and restrict K to be [–6, +6], since we expect each 
quarterly earnings announcement to be approximately 12 weeks apart,15  
 
4. For each quarterly earnings announcement of each firm, we index every Pit(K) by 
K, where K = [-6, +6],   
 
5. If the earnings announcement date comes before or at the same time as the date of 
the quote in a particular week t, let Ri,t(K) = Ln (Pi,t(K) /Pi,t(K-1)), with K~ [-5,6], 
 
6. If the earnings announcement date comes after the date of the quote in a particular 
week t, let Ri,t(K) = Ln (Pi,t(K+1) /Pi,t(K)), with K ~ [-5,6]. 
 
                                                 
14 We differ from Hanjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) in dealing with non-consecutive trades for the following 
reasons.  First, Hanjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) use daily trading data on bond, whereas we only have 
weekly data. Second, our main interest is about the timing of loan price response to earnings information 
during the pre-announcement period, while Hanjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) test how the bond market react 
to dividend change announcements. Calculating multi-day returns will not affect the inferences regarding 
how the market reacts.  However, calculating multi-week returns will affect the inference regarding when 
the market reacts.    
15 If two adjacent earnings announcement dates are less than 12 weeks apart, then we have an overlap 
problem in terms of indexing our weekly quotes. For example, one firm in our sample announced the 4th 
quarter earnings of the prior year on February 14, and announced the first quarter earnings of the current 
year on April 24, so that the +6 week event corresponding to the February earnings announcement overlaps 
the –6 week event for the next earnings announcement. In that case, we consider the +6 week observation 
to be missing, since our main interest lies in examining the loan returns prior to earnings announcements.     
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To estimate the market return during a particular week t, denoted MRt, we obtain 
weekly quotes on the S&P/LSTA syndicated bank loan index.  LSTA, in conjunction 
with Standard & Poor’s, maintains a weekly index of senior bank loan prices.  The 
S&P/LSTA syndicated bank loan index currently includes 470 loan facilities totaling 
$104 billion in value outstanding, covering around 70% of the institutional loan market. 
Starting in January 1999, the S&P/LSTA index provides weekly quotes on the leveraged 
loan market. To align loan index return with each individual loan return, we repeat the 
indexing procedure described above on the S&P/LSTA weekly index quotes, for each 
quarterly earnings announcement and for each firm. 
4.1.2  Testing Variables    
 We examine the impact of the quarterly earnings announcement on the dependent 
variable, the weekly loan return Rit.  Following Beaver et al. (1997), the quarterly 
earnings variable, denoted CEiqy, is the change in earnings for quarter q from the current 
year y to the year y-1, normalized by the level of earnings for quarter q in the year y-1.  
We test the timing of the earnings announcement using an indicator variable, Kit, that is 
set equal to one if the observed loan return for facility i in week t is K weeks prior to the 
earnings announcement week; zero otherwise. We observe loan price behaviors from five 
weeks prior to the earnings announcement (i.e., week K = –5) to the week of the earnings 
announcement (i.e., week K = 0).16  Our primary interest is to find out how loan prices 
respond to the forthcoming earnings information during the five weeks of pre-
announcement period, i.e., whether there is information leakage during the pre-
announcement period in the private debt market. 
                                                 
16 We start from week –5 because we don’t have enough observations for week –6. 
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Since we expect an asymmetric price reaction to earnings information, we split 
the sample into observations with an increase in the upcoming earnings announcement 
(denoted, good news) and observations with a decrease in the upcoming earnings 
announcement (bad news).   Specifically, we separate good news firms from bad news 
observations for each firm i using annual unscaled changes in earnings per share, as 
calculated from quarter q in year y-1 to the same quarter in year y; that is, CE
∧
iqy = Eiqy – 
Eiqy-1. If the change in earnings is less than zero, then that firm-quarter observation is 
classified as bad news; otherwise, it is put into the good news sample.17   
We are also interested in whether differences exist between intangible-intensive 
firms versus non-intangible-intensive firms in terms of the informativeness of syndicated 
loan prices. For firms with high amounts of intangibles, the information asymmetry is 
largest due to the nature and extent of uncertainty associated with intangibles (Lev, 
2001). Prior studies (Barth et al., 2001, Barron et al., 2001) have found high information 
content in analyst forecasts for high intangible-intensive firms.  Therefore, we expect 
intangible firms to have a greater price impact before an earnings announcement. 
To test whether the information content of corporate earnings announcements is 
related to the tangibility of a firm’s assets, (hypothesis H3), we utilize an indicator 
variable differentiating intangible-intensive firms versus non-intangible-intensive firms. 
Following Amir, Lev and Sougiannis (2003), we define intangible intensive firms using 
the following three-digit SIC codes: 283 (Drugs); 284 (Chemicals); 357 (Computer and 
Office Equipment); 366 (Communications Equipment); 367 (Electronics); 371 (Motor 
                                                 
17 We use this definition of bad/good news (as in Foster (1977) and Kothari (2001)) because more 
complicated time-series models have not improved the results in other studies testing the relationship 
between short-window returns and quarterly earnings announcements.  
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Vehicles); 382 (Measurement and Control Devices); 384 (Medical Instruments); and 737 
(Software).18   We then construct a dummy variable, denoted INTANGIBLEi, set equal to 
one for these three-digit SIC codes, and zero otherwise.  We use the INTANGIBLEi 
variable to break our full sample into four subsamples: good news (increasing earnings) 
intangible (INTANGIBLEi = 1) firms, good news tangible (INTANGIBLEi = 0) firms, bad 
news (decreasing earnings) intangible firms and bad news tangible firms. 
4.1.3 Other Control Variables 
 It is well known that firm size is negatively associated with stock returns 
(Schwert, 1983; Easton and Zmijewski, 1989). Since firm size can be related to many 
economic factors of a firm, such as systematic risk, the association between firm size and 
syndicated loan returns is unpredictable. As a control variable, we use the standard size 
variable SIZEiq defined to be the log of the market capitalization of firm i at the beginning 
of quarter q (where q encompasses weeks K ~ [-5,6]), as obtained from Compustat 
quarterly tapes. 
Loan prices are extremely sensitive to default risk.  As a proxy for the loan’s 
credit risk, we use Moody’s senior debt ratings information on each loan facility, as 
provided in the LPC Dealscan database.19  We coded RATINGi into 1 through 7 to 
represent the ratings of Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B and lower than B. Higher default risk (a 
higher value of RATINGi) is related to lower loan returns, therefore, we expect a negative 
relation between RATINGi and the dependent variable.     
                                                 
18 For robustness checks, we also defined intangible firms to be those firms with a Tobin’s q exceeding one 
and obtained similar results to those presented in the paper. 
19 These credit ratings are assigned as of the loan origination and may change over the life of the loan.  As a 
robustness check, we therefore defined the probability of default for each loan facility i at each week t 
using a structural model similar to that of Merton (1974). For a description of options-theoretic credit risk 
measurement models, see Saunders and Allen (2002), chapter 4. 
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The last set of variables controls for loan specific features. The interest rate on the 
loan is measured as the natural log of the basis point spread over LIBOR, inclusive of all 
fees, called the all-in-spread, denoted LSPREADit.  In general, this spread is fixed over 
the life of the loan.20  Ceteris paribus, the higher the spread, the riskier the loan. High 
credit risk loans generally experience lower returns. John, Lynch and Puri (2002) find a 
negative relationship between yields on corporate bonds and risk (as measured by credit 
ratings).  Therefore, a negative relationship between returns and LSPREADit is expected 
in the context of syndicated bank loans. To measure the liquidity of the syndicated bank 
loan market for facility i in week t, we define NOQUOTESit to be the log of the number 
of weekly quotes.  Since loans trade at an illiquidity discount, the more liquid the loan 
(the higher the NOQUOTESit), the lower the required rate of return.  
An indicator variable DISTRESSit specifies whether the loan is distressed or not. It 
is set equal to 1 (zero otherwise) if the mean of the mean price of facility i in week t for a 
particular quarterly earnings announcement event is less than 80. During the time period 
of our study (1998-2002), many of the distressed loans in our sample are “fallen angels,” 
i.e., par loans that declined in value as the borrowing firm experienced deterioration in its 
creditworthiness.  This price decline would produce a negative relationship between loan 
returns and the DISTRESSit control variable.  We also define a dummy variable that takes 
on the value of one if the loan has financial covenants that might require special reporting 
of financial and accounting data, denoted COVENANTi.  The existence of financial 
covenants obligates the borrower to reveal detailed accounting data to the loan syndicate 
on a periodic basis (usually monthly).  Because this condition would reduce the market’s 
                                                 
20 The exception to this is for loans with a performance pricing grid, that specifies changes in the spread in 
response to changes in the borrowing firm’s financial condition, as measured by credit rating or accounting 
ratio. 
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uncertainty about loan value, therefore, ceteris paribus, we anticipate a negative (positive) 
relationship between loan returns and the COVENANTit dummy variable for bad (good) 
news firms.21  Another indicator variable is set equal to one (zero otherwise) if the loan is 
secured by collateral, denoted  SECUREDi.  Since secured loans tend to be riskier, 
thereby accounting for the collateral requirement, (see, for example, Berger and Udell, 
1990), we anticipate a positive relationship between loan returns and the SECUREDit 
dummy variable, all else equal.  
                                                
We also include the log of years to maturity of the loan 
(MATUi) to control for the degree of interest rate exposure. Longer maturity results to 
higher interest rate exposure. Hence, it is expected to be positively related to loan returns.  
Finally, we use log of the size of the loan facility (LOANSIZEi) to measure each loan’s 
marketability. The larger the size of the loan, the more frequently the loan is expected to 
be traded, which is expected to be negatively related to the return of the loan.  
4.1.4 The Empirical Model 
We estimate the following model to examine the information content of quarterly 
earnings announcements in syndicated bank loan prices: 
Rit = α + β1MRt + β2CEiq+ β3SIZEiq+ β4RATINGi + β5LSPREADit 
                 + β6NOQUOTEit  + β7DISTRESSit + β8COVENANTi + β9SECUREDi  
                 + β10MATUi  + β11LOANSIZEi  +β12Kit + εit           (2) 
Equation (2) is re-estimated six times for K = -5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0 representing the week of 
the observed loan returns prior to a quarterly earnings announcement. 
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
21 Bradley and Roberts (2004) use the LPC Dealscan database and find an inverse relationship between loan 
yields and the presence of covenants. 
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Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the 11,034 loan return observations. Panel A 
reports the summary statistics of the variables in the overall sample.  As can be seen from 
Panel A of Table 1, the average weekly return on the loan facilities in our sample as a 
whole is slightly negative over the sample period, and the average percentage change in 
quarterly earnings over the same period is –0.5433. Given that our sample period covers 
the Russian debt default, the bursting of the high tech bubble and the resulting recession 
in the US, syndicated loan prices generally declined over the 1998-2002 period. The 
average firm size in our sample is around 3.2 billion dollars, with the smallest firm’s 
market capitalization of 0.7 million dollars and the largest of 103 billion dollars, which 
indicates that our sample firms are widely distributed in their sizes. In terms of industry 
classification, about 30% of the borrowing firms in our sample are in intangible-intensive 
industries. The average Tobin’s q ratio for all firms in our sample is 0.9674. In terms of 
the loan facilities in our sample, 17.6% are distressed loans, 86.2% have financial 
covenants, and 88.3% of them are secured. The average loan spread is about 287 basis 
points over LIBOR, the average number of quotes is around 9, the mean maturity of the 
loans is slightly over 6 years, and the average loan size is around $560 million.      
The most common financial covenant requires monthly reporting of EBITDA in 
order to calculate the borrower’s debt to EBITDA ratio.  In our full LPC database, 
94.69% (out of a total of 1,148 loan facilities) of the loans specified a covenant limiting 
the maximum allowable debt to EBITDA ratio, with a median initial maximum allowable 
debt to EBITDA ratio of 5.50.  Another common financial covenant (specified in 22.21% 
of the loan facilities in the full sample) is a minimum net worth limitation (median value 
of $237.3 million).   
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Since we expect an asymmetric price reaction to earnings information, we split 
the sample into observations with an increase in the upcoming earnings announcement 
(denoted, good news) and observations with a decrease in the upcoming earnings 
announcement (bad news).   As can be seen from Table 1, the sample is rather evenly 
split: 6,003 observations in the good news subsample and 5,031 observations in the bad 
news subsample.  We report the summary statistics of the loan observations in the bad 
news and good news subsamples in Panels B and C of Table 1, respectively. We further 
test the mean and variance differences between the bad and good news subsample in 
Panel D of Table 1. As seen from Table 1, Panel D, the loan observations in the bad news 
group are significantly different (at the 5% level or better) from the good news group 
observations.  On average, loans in the bad news group have lower weekly returns, lower 
credit ratings, and higher spreads over LIBOR.  Moreover, bad (good) news observations 
tend to be clustered during times when the loan market declined (increased), as shown by 
the positive t-statistic for the market return (MRt) mean difference. Bad news is observed, 
on average, for companies that are more likely to be in intangible-intensive industries.  
Loan facilities in the bad news group tend to be larger, have greater liquidity (in terms of 
the number of quotations) and shorter maturity. They are less likely to be secured, to have 
financial covenants, but more likely to be distressed.  
 
4.3 Empirical Results 
To present an overview of our empirical results, in Figure 1 we plot weekly 
returns on syndicated bank loans in a return window of [-6, +6] weeks around quarterly 
earnings announcements.  A cursory review reveals that there is little or no significant 
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loan price reactions to the corporate earnings announcement itself, but bad news (declines 
in earnings) are reflected in debt prices about a month before the earnings announcement 
date.  There is no similar debt price reaction to good news (increases in earnings). 22 
Evidence in Figure 1 seems suggest that there is significant information leakage 
regarding the upcoming declines in earnings during the pre-announcement period in the 
secondary syndicated loan market. These illustrative results motivate us to proceed to the 
more rigorous empirical tests of our hypotheses.  
We begin our formal tests with an estimate of equation (2) using panel data that is 
pooled both cross-sectionally and intertemporally. We include year indicator variables to 
allow the intercepts to vary by year from 1998 to 2003.23  We estimate equation (2) for 
the overall sample of firms, as well as for various subsamples separately, in order to test 
our three hypotheses.   
Table 2 presents the estimation of equation (2) for the entire sample for each of 
weeks K = –5 to the week of the earnings announcement (K = 0) consecutively.  Results 
in Table 2 indicate that the only week coefficient that is significant at the 5% level is  
–0.0006 for week K = –4, suggesting that there is a negative announcement effect 
approximately one month prior to the earnings release dates.  Interestingly, we find that 
the coefficient on the Kit dummy variable when week K equals 0 is insignificantly 
different from zero. This finding is quite different from the stylized fact in the equity 
market that earnings announcements are associated with significant stock market 
movements. We thus reject the null hypothesis H1 that the information content of 
                                                 
22 We conduct a similar test on raw equity returns at the time of the earnings announcement. As one would 
expect, there is a statistically significant increase in security prices at the time of the release of the earnings 
announcement.  
23 Because the coefficients on the year variables were generally insignificant, they are not reported in 
Tables 2-4. 
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earnings announcements is reflected in bank loan prices on the announcement date. Due 
to the unique information flows in the syndicated bank loan market, the information 
about corporate earnings is reflected in bank loan prices approximately four weeks prior 
to the announcement. That is, private lenders know about earnings information earlier 
than other public security holders.  
 Consistent with our expectations, the coefficient on the loan rating variable is 
negatively significant in all of our regressions reported in Table 2, which indicates that 
the higher the value of the RATINGi variable, the lower the loan’s credit rating, the higher 
the default risk, and the lower the weekly loan returns.  Firm size and loan facility size 
are also significant negative, indicating that the larger the firm and the larger the size of 
the loan, the lower the loan returns. The log of the All-In-Spread variable, and the 
number of weekly quotes variables are significantly negative, consistent with our 
expectations that the more liquid the loan, the lower the returns. 
However, the results in Table 2 are obtained for the aggregate sample, and 
therefore, cannot be used to test H2, which hypothesizes an asymmetric response in bank 
loan prices to good versus bad news.  In Table 3, we re-estimate equation (2) for the bad 
news and good news subsamples separately.24  The insignificant coefficient on Kit for 
week equals zero in both Panel A (bad news subsample) and Panel B (good news 
subsample) further supporting our conclusion that earnings announcements are not 
reflected in loan prices during the week of the announcement event (i.e., we reject H1).  
Moreover, none of the week indicator variables’ coefficients are significant for the good 
news subsample, suggesting that there is no significant impact on loan returns resulting 
                                                 
24 We also used a dummy variable for Good News/Bad News in equation (2) as both a control variable and 
as an interactive variable (i.e., cross-product with the week dummies, the change in earnings variable, etc.), 
and found similar results to those presented in Table 3 for the disaggregated subsamples.   
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from increases in earnings.  In contrast, however, the adjusted R2s in the bad news group 
regressions are 1.22% and larger, compared with those of less than 0.4% in the good 
news subsample regressions. More importantly, the coefficients on week K =  –5 and 
week K = –4 are statistically significant (at the 5% level or better) for the bad news 
subsample, suggesting that declines in earnings are reflected in loan returns 
approximately one month (4 or 5 weeks) before the actual earnings announcement. The 
signs of both of these coefficients are negative, suggesting that loan returns decline one 
month prior to the announcement of earnings declines.  This time period corresponds to 
the time frame during which bank loan syndicate members generally receive covenant 
reports that may include detailed financial information on earnings.  Thus, when 
deteriorating financial information of the borrowers becomes available to private lenders, 
the secondary loan market expeditiously reflected that information into loan prices. 
However, improving financial information about borrowers is not reflected in syndicated 
loan prices, suggesting that loan contracts generally expose lenders to downside risk, but 
not the upside gains. Therefore, our finding of an asymmetric reaction in loan prices to 
good versus bad news is consistent with the nature of the debt contract, which suggests a 
rejection of the null hypothesis H2. 
Similar to the results in Table 2, we find that log of firm size, loan rating as well 
as the number of weekly quotes of a loan are significantly negative in our bad news 
subsample. The financial covenant indicator variable is also negative significant, 
indicating that the existence of financial covenants obligates borrowers to reveal “bad” 
accounting data to the loan syndicate, which lowers the return of their loans. For good 
news firms, we find this covenant variable to be positive, consistent with the view that 
 27
periodic “good” accounting information of the borrower reduces the uncertainty about its 
loan’s market value, which slightly increases the loan returns.    
Finally, we test hypothesis H3 to see if there is an asymmetric impact on bank 
loan prices that depends on the level of tangibility of the borrowing firm’s assets.  In 
Table 4, we estimate equation (2) separately for each of four subsamples: the bad 
news/intangible firms (characterized by earnings declines and borrowing firms classified 
in intangible industries – regression results reported in Table 4, Panel A); the bad 
news/tangible firms (Panel B); good news/intangible firms (increasing earnings and 
borrowing firms classified in intangible industries - Panel C) and the good news/tangible 
firms (Panel D).  As can be seen from Table 4, the adjusted R2s for regressions on firms 
in the intangible-intensive industries are always larger than the adjusted R2s for 
regressions on firms in less intangible-intensive industries. For bad news group, the 
adjusted R2s for regressions on intangible firms are 4.75% and larger, compared with 
those of less than 0.9% in the tangible firms regressions. Similarly for the good news 
subsample, the adjusted R2s for regressions on intangible firms are 1.31% and larger, 
compared with those of 0.03% in the tangible firms regressions. These findings indicate 
that accounting information is generally more helpful in explaining loan returns when the 
borrowers have more intangible assets on their balance sheets.    
 As can be seen from Table 4, none of the week dummy variables (for K = -5 to 0) 
are statistically significant for the good news groups (Panels C and D).  However, the  
–0.001 coefficient on the variable indicating week K = -4 prior to the earnings 
announcement date is significant at the 5% level for the bad news/tangible firms (Panel 
B).  Most striking, however, is that the week K = -4 and K=–3 coefficients are also 
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significant at the 1% level for the bad news/intangibles firms (Panel A).  Moreover, the 
absolute value size of the negative coefficients are larger (-0.0028 and –0.0021) than for 
the bad news/tangible firms (-0.001), suggesting a greater decline in loan returns for 
intangible firms experiencing decreases in earnings as compared to any other group.  The 
coefficient on the size of the earnings decline, CEit, is statistically significant at the 10% 
level or better for the bad news/intangible firm group only, suggesting a further decline in 
loan returns for these firms.  Thus, we find evidence that supports the existence of an 
asymmetric information effect of quarterly earnings announcements on bank loan returns 
for firms with intangible assets experiencing earnings declines.  That is, earnings and 
other cash flow information are most important for informationally opaque firms with 
intangible assets that have financial difficulties. Our findings therefore reject the null 
hypothesis H3 in favor of this asymmetric impact effect. 
  
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we utilize quotations for syndicated bank loans in order to examine 
the information content of quarterly earnings announcements to private debt holders in 
the syndicated bank loan market. We find that this market reflects information about 
accounting earnings into loan prices approximately one month prior to its reflection in 
equity prices equity market.  Moreover, we find evidence that bank loan prices are 
impacted by declines in earnings rather than increases in earnings, consistent with the 
nature of debt as exposed to downside loss, but with limited upside gain potential.   
Finally, earnings information is most relevant and has the largest impact on bank loan 
prices if the borrowing firm’s assets are intangible and therefore difficult to evaluate and 
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monitor.  Thus, earnings information is used by investors in the bank loan market to price 
syndicated loans when other sources of information are either unavailable or unreliable. 
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Figure 1 
 
Mean Portfolio Returns on Syndicated Loans By Type of News 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics of the Variables Used in the Overall Firms Sample 
Variable N Mean Std. dev. Median Min Max 
Rit 11034 -0.0001 0.0055 0.000 -0.0458 0.0422 
MRt 11034 0.0015 0.0119 0.0012 -0.0433 0.0567 
CEiq 11034     -0.5433 10.1065 -0.1300 -363.6700 62.2600 
SIZEiq 11034 3262.0000 8419.0000 960.3168 0.7181 103441.0000 
Intangiblei 11034 0.3092 0.4622 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Tobin’s qiq 10750 0.9674 1.6375 0.8263 0.0790 45.8714 
RATINGi 11034 5.5334 0.8817 6.0000 3.0000 7.0000 
SPREADit 11034 287.8433 111.5056 275.0000 30.0000 550.0000 
NOQUOTESit 11034 8.9282 5.1928 6.0000 4.0000 28.0000 
DISTRESSiq 11034 0.1760 0.3808 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
COVENANTi 11034 0.8617 0.3451 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
SECUREDi 11034 0.8834 0.3210 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
MATUi 11034 6.2407 1.5694 6.6400 1.0000 9.2200 
LOANSIZEi 11034 561.4557 2024.0000 270.0000 40.0000 25000.0000 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics of the Variables Used in the Bad News Firms Sample 
Variable N Mean Std. dev. Median Min Max 
Rit 5031 -0.0004 0.0063 0.0000 -0.0458 0.0414 
MRt 5031 0.0012 0.0122 0.0010 -0.0433 0.0567 
CEiq 5031 -1.0166 13.9414 -0.4000 -363.6700 62.2600 
SIZEiq 5031 3736.0000 10072.0000 907.4464 1.1250 103441.0000 
Intangiblei 5031 0.3492 0.4768 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Tobin’s qiq 4864 0.9831 2.0738 0.8408 0.2387 45.8714 
RATINGi 5031 5.6404 0.9053 6.0000 3.0000 7.0000 
SPREADit 5031 296.2648 115.6560 300.0000 30.0000 550.0000 
NOQUOTESit 5031 9.1544 5.3597 8.0000 4.0000 28.0000 
DISTRESSiq 5031 0.1898 0.3922 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
COVENANTi 5031 0.8511 0.3560 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
SECUREDi 5031 0.8734 0.3326 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
MATUi 5031 6.2227 1.6575 6.8500 1.0000 9.2200 
LOANSIZEi 5031 672.5747 2463.0000 285.0000 40.0000 25000.0000 
 
Panel C: Summary Statistics of the Variables Used in the Good News Firms Sample 
Variable N Mean Std. dev. Median Min Max 
Rit 6003 -0.0001 0.0046 0.0000 -0.0439 0.0422 
MRt 6003 0.0018 0.0117 0.0013 -0.0433 0.0567 
CEiq 6003 -0.1466 4.9522 0.1100 -85.0000 30.0000 
SIZEiq 6003 2864.0000 6703.0000 993.1400 0.7181 91561.0000 
Intangiblei 6003 0.2757 0.4469 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Tobin’s qiq 5886 0.9545 1.1592 0.8158 0.0790 23.5694 
RATINGi 6003 5.4438 0.8511 5.000 3.000 7.000 
SPREADit 6003 280.7854 107.4067 275.0000 30.0000 550.0000 
NOQUOTESit 6003 8.7386 5.0413 6.0000 4.0000 26.0000 
DISTRESSiq 6003 0.1644 0.3707 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
COVENANTi 6003 0.8707 0.3355 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
SECUREDi 6003 0.8917 0.3108 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
MATUi 6003 6.2558 1.4914 6.5200 1.0000 9.2200 
LOANSIZEi 6003 468.3290 1557.0000 250.0000 40.0000 25000.0000 
 36
 
Panel D: Tests on Mean and Variance Differences of the Variables Between Good/Bad News Firms  
Variable T-test   F-Test  
Rit 2.66∗∗∗ 1.88∗∗∗ 
MRt 2.57∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 
CEiq 4.51∗∗∗ 7.93∗∗∗ 
SIZEiq -5.42∗∗∗ 2.26∗∗∗ 
Intangiblei -8.35∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 
Tobin’s qiq 0.90 3.20∗∗∗ 
RATINGi -11.74∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ 
SPREADit -3.66∗∗∗ 1.20∗∗∗ 
NOQUOTESit -3.73∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗ 
DISTRESSiq -3.49∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗ 
COVENANTi 2.97∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ 
SECUREDi 2.99∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 
MATUi 2.77∗∗∗ 1.34∗∗∗ 
LOANSIZEi -9.82∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗∗ 
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the 11034 firm/loan-quarter observations over the period 
1998-2002 used in the overall firms’ sample, and in both good/bad news firms, and the comparison 
between the two groups (good-bad).  Rit is the weekly return on syndicated loan facility i in week t. MRt is 
return on S&P syndicated loan index in week t. CEiq is the percentage change in quarterly earnings 
measured by changes in earnings for quarter q from the current year to the prior year for firm i.  SIZEiq is 
firm size, measured by the market capitalization (in millions of dollars)at the beginning of quarter q for 
firm i. Intangiblei is an indicator variable that takes the value of one is firm i is in an intangible-intensive 
industry, and zero otherwise. Tobin’s qiq is measured by the market value of firm i’s assets over its book 
value of assets at the beginning of the quarter q. RATINGi is an indicator variable coded into 1 through 7 to 
represent Moody’s senior debt ratings of Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B and lower than B on facility i. SPREADit 
is all-in spread, measured by the basis point spread over LIBOR, inclusive of all fees for facility i at week 
t. NOQUOTESit is the total number of weekly quotes on facility i at week t. DISTRESSiq is distressed loan 
indicator that takes the value of one if the price of the loan is less than 80 at week –5 of earnings 
announcement for quarter q and zero otherwise. COVENANTi is an indicator variable that equals one if a 
loan has financial covenant and zero otherwise. SECUREDi equals one if a loan is secured and zero 
otherwise. MATUi measures the maturity of the loan in terms of the number of years from the loan 
origination to its maturity. LOANSIZEi is the size of the loan at its origination, it is expressed in thousands 
of dollars. The superscript asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at or below the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level, 
respectively, based on a two-tailed (T-test) or a one-tailed (F-test) test of significance. 
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Table 2  
OLS Regressions of Weekly Syndicated Loan Returns in a Window of [-5,0] Weeks 
Around Quarterly Earnings Announcement Dates  
 
Model: Rit = α + β1MRt + β2CEiq+ β3SIZEiq+ β4RATINGi + β5LSPREADit + β6NOQUOTEit   
                      +β7DISTRESSit + β8COVENANTi + β9SECUREDi  + β10MATUi  + β11LOANSIZEi          
                      +β12Kit + εit 
 
 
 Predicted 
Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MR 
 
+ 0.0088 
(1.99) ∗∗ 
0.0087 
(1.97) ∗∗ 
0.0088 
(1.99) ∗∗ 
0.0089 
(2.00) ∗∗ 
0.0089 
(1.99) ∗∗ 
0.0086 
(1.93) ∗ 
Percentage Change in 
Earnings 
+ 0.0000 
(1.25) 
0.0000 
(1.25) 
0.0000 
(1.25) 
0.0000 
(1.26) 
0.0000 
(1.24) 
0.0000 
(1.25) 
Log of Firm Size 
 
? -0.0001 
(-2.22)∗∗ 
-0.0001 
(-2.23)∗∗ 
-0.0001 
(-2.22)∗∗ 
-0.0001 
(-2.21)∗∗ 
-0.0001 
(-2.21)∗∗ 
-0.0001 
(-2.34)∗∗ 
Loan Rate 
 
- -0.0003 
(-4.39) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0003 
(-4.38) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0003 
(-4.39) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0003 
(-4.39) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0003 
(-4.40) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0003 
(-4.53) ∗∗∗ 
Log of All-In Spread 
(Basis Points over 
LIBOR) 
? -0.0004 
(-2.29) ∗∗ 
-0.0004 
(-2.31) ∗∗ 
-0.0004 
(-2.29) ∗∗ 
-0.0004 
(-2.28) ∗∗ 
-0.0004 
(-2.28) ∗∗ 
-0.0003 
(-2.18) ∗∗ 
Log of Number of 
Quotes 
- 
 
-0.0003 
(-3.08)∗∗ 
-0.0003 
(-3.08)∗∗ 
-0.0003 
(-3.08)∗∗ 
-0.0003 
(-3.08)∗∗ 
-0.0003 
(-3.08)∗∗ 
-0.0003 
(-3.18)∗∗ 
Distressed Loan 
Indicator 
- -0.0000 
(-0.21) 
-0.0000 
(-0.22) 
-0.0000 
(-0.12) 
-0.0000 
(-0.14) 
-0.0000 
(-0.11) 
-0.0000 
(-0.15) 
Financial Covenants 
Indicator 
? -0.0001 
(-0.85) 
-0.0001 
(-0.83) 
-0.0001 
(-0.84) 
-0.0001 
(-0.84) 
-0.0001 
(-0.85) 
-0.0001 
(-0.66) 
Secured Loan 
Indicator 
+ 
 
0.0001 
(0.29) 
0.0001 
(0.30) 
0.0001 
(0.29) 
0.0001 
(0.30) 
0.0001 
(0.29) 
0.0001 
(0.42) 
Log of Maturity in 
Years  
+ 
 
-0.0002 
(-0.88) 
-0.0002 
(-0.88) 
-0.0002 
(-0.88) 
-0.0002 
(-0.88) 
-0.0002 
(-0.88) 
-0.0002 
(-0.90) 
Log of Loan Size  - -0.0003 
(-3.57) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0003 
(-3.58) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0003 
(-3.57) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0003 
(-3.57) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0003 
(-3.57) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0003 
(-3.41) ∗∗∗ 
Week –5 
 
? -0.0002 
(-1.22) 
     
Week –4 
 
?  -0.0006 
(-2.54) ∗∗ 
    
Week –3 
 
?   -0.0002 
(-1.07) 
   
Week –2 
 
?    -0.0004 
(-1.86)∗ 
  
Week –1 ? 
 
    -0.0001 
(-0.45) 
 
Week 0 ? 
 
     0.0002 
(0.82) 
Observations  11034 11034 11034 11034 11034 11034 
Adjusted R2  0.0079 0.0087 0.0078 0.0081 0.0078 0.0079 
Notes: This table reports regression results for testing the information content of quarterly earnings on 
syndicated loan returns using pooled cross-sectional, time-series ordinary least squares for 11034 firm-
quarter observations over –5 to 0 weeks of each quarterly earnings announcement during 1998-2002 
period. Rit is the weekly return on syndicated loan facility i in week t. MRt is return on S&P syndicated 
loan index in week t. CEiq is the percentage change in quarterly earnings measured by changes in earnings 
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for quarter q from the current year to the prior year for firm i. SIZEiq is firm size, measured by the market 
capitalization (in millions of dollars)at the beginning of quarter q for firm i. RATINGi is an indicator 
variable coded into 1 through 7 to represent Moody’s senior debt ratings of Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B and 
lower than B on facility i. SPREADit is all-in spread, measured by the basis point spread over LIBOR, 
inclusive of all fees for facility i at week t. NOQUOTESit is the total number of weekly quotes on facility i 
at week t. DISTRESSiq is distressed loan indicator that takes the value of one if the price of the loan is less 
than 80 at week –5 of earnings announcement at quarter q and zero otherwise. COVENANTi is an indicator 
variable that equals one if a loan has financial covenant and zero otherwise. SECUREDi equals one if a 
loan is secured and zero otherwise. MATUi measures the maturity of the loan in terms of the number of 
years from the loan origination to its maturity. LOANSIZEi is the size of the loan at its origination, it is 
expressed in thousands of dollars. Kit is a dummy variable that equal 1s if the observed loan return at week 
t of firm i is in K weeks prior to its quarterly earnings announcement date, and zero otherwise. Regression 
is repeated for K=[-5,0]. Regressions also contain year indicators. T-tests are in the parenthesis below the 
coefficient, and p-values are calculated using White’s standard errors. The superscript asterisks *, **, *** 
denote significance at or below the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively, based on a two-tailed (where sign is 
not predicted) or a one-tailed (where sign is predicted) test of significance. 
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Table 3 
OLS Regressions of Weekly Syndicated Loan Returns in a Window of [-5,0] Weeks 
Around Quarterly Earnings Announcement Dates – By Type of News 
 
 
Model: Rit = α + β1MRt + β2CEiq+ β3SIZEiq+ β4RATINGi + β5LSPREADit + β6NOQUOTEit   
                      +β7DISTRESSit + β8COVENANTi + β9SECUREDi  + β10MATUi  + β11LOANSIZEi          
                      +β12Kit + εit  
   
 
Panel A: Bad News Firms 
 Predicted  
Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MR 
 
+ 0.0110 
(1.62) 
0.0111 
(1.63) 
0.0108 
(1.58) 
0.0108 
(1.58) 
0.0110 
(1.62) 
0.0108 
(1.58) 
Percentage Change in 
Earnings 
+ 0.0000 
(0.70) 
0.0000 
(0.71) 
0.0000 
(0.71) 
0.0000 
(0.71) 
0.0000 
(0.69) 
0.0000 
(0.70) 
Log of Firm Size 
 
? -0.0002 
(-3.44) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0002 
(-3.42) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0002 
(-3.41) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0002 
(-3.39) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0002 
(-3.39) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0002 
(-3.39) ∗∗∗ 
Loan Rate 
 
- -0.0005 
(-4.36) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0005 
(-4.38) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0005 
(-4.38) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0005 
(-4.38) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0005 
(-4.38) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0005 
(-4.38) ∗∗∗ 
Log of All-In Spread 
(Basis Points over 
LIBOR) 
? -0.0001 
(-0.49)   
-0.0001 
(-0.48)   
-0.0001 
(-0.48)   
-0.0001 
(-0.47)   
-0.0001 
(-0.46)   
-0.0001 
(-0.47)   
Log of Number of 
Quotes 
- 
 
-0.0004 
(-2.30)∗∗ 
-0.0004 
(-2.32)∗∗ 
-0.0004 
(-2.33)∗∗ 
-0.0004 
(-2.33)∗∗ 
-0.0004 
(-2.33)∗∗ 
-0.0004 
(-2.34)∗∗ 
Distressed Loan 
Indicator 
- -0.0001 
(-0.29)  
-0.0000 
(-0.16)  
-0.0001 
(-0.12)  
-0.0000 
(-0.12)  
-0.0000 
(-0.11)  
-0.0000 
(-0.10)  
Financial Covenants 
Indicator 
- -0.0004 
(-1.82) ∗ 
-0.0005 
(-1.81) ∗ 
-0.0005 
(-1.81) ∗ 
-0.0005 
(-1.82) ∗ 
-0.0005 
(-1.82) ∗ 
-0.0005 
(-1.82) ∗ 
Secured Loan 
Indicator 
+ 0.0003 
(0.66) 
0.0003 
(0.65) 
0.0003 
(0.65) 
0.0003 
(0.65) 
0.0003 
(0.66) 
0.0003 
(0.65) 
Log of Maturity in 
Years  
+ 0.0001 
(0.21) 
0.0001 
(0.22) 
0.0001 
(0.21) 
0.0001 
(0.22) 
0.0001 
(0.22) 
0.0001 
(0.22) 
Log of Loan Size  - -0.0001 
(-0.88)  
-0.0001 
(-0.88)  
-0.0001 
(-0.86)  
-0.0001 
(-0.86)  
-0.0001 
(-0.87)  
-0.0001 
(-0.86)   
Week –5 
 
- -0.0007 
(-2.26) ∗∗ 
     
Week –4 
 
-  -0.0008 
(-3.24) ∗∗∗ 
    
Week –3 
 
-   -0.0004 
(-1.41) 
   
Week –2 
 
-    -0.0004 
(-1.47) 
  
Week –1 - 
 
     -0.0002 
(0.73) 
 
Week 0 - 
 
     0.0002 
(0.73) 
Observations  5031 5031 5031 5031 5031 5031 
Adjusted R2  0.0131 0.0134 0.0125 0.0125 0.0122 0.0122 
 40
 Panel B: Good News Firms 
 
 Predicted  
Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MR 
 
+ 0.0085 
(1.50) 
0.0083 
(1.46) 
0.0084 
(1.49) 
0.0085 
(1.51) 
0.0085 
(1.50) 
0.0083 
(1.49) 
Percentage Change in 
Earnings 
+ 0.0000 
(0.35)  
0.0000 
(0.34)  
0.0000 
(0.35)  
0.0000 
(0.35)  
0.0000 
(0.35)  
0.0000 
(0.41)  
Log of Firm Size 
 
? -0.0000 
(-0.28) 
-0.0000 
(-0.29) 
-0.0000 
(-0.28) 
-0.0000 
(-0.29) 
-0.0000 
(-0.28) 
-0.0000 
(-0.15) 
Loan Rate 
 
- -0.0001 
(-1.50)  
-0.0001 
(-1.48)  
-0.0001 
(-1.50)  
-0.0001 
(-1.49)  
-0.0001 
(-1.50)  
-0.0001 
(-1.35)  
Log of All-In Spread 
(Basis Points over 
LIBOR) 
? -0.0004 
(-2.12) ∗∗ 
-0.0004 
(-2.13) ∗∗ 
-0.0004 
(-2.12) ∗∗ 
-0.0004 
(-2.12) ∗∗ 
-0.0004 
(-2.12) ∗∗ 
-0.0004 
(-1.90) ∗ 
Log of Number of 
Quotes 
- 
 
-0.0002 
(-1.13)  
-0.0002 
(-1.13)  
-0.0002 
(-1.13)  
-0.0002 
(-1.13)  
-0.0002 
(-1.13)  
-0.0002 
(-1.20)  
Distressed Loan 
Indicator 
- -0.0000 
(-0.21)  
-0.0001 
(-0.31)  
-0.0000 
(-0.24)  
-0.0000 
(-0.25)  
-0.0000 
(-0.24)  
-0.0000 
(-0.02)  
Financial Covenants 
Indicator 
+ 0.0002 
(1.04) 
0.0002 
(1.04) 
0.0002 
(1.04) 
0.0002 
(1.04) 
0.0002 
(1.04) 
0.0002 
(1.13) 
Secured Loan 
Indicator 
+ 0.0003 
(0.84) 
0.0003 
(0.84) 
0.0003 
(0.84) 
0.0003 
(0.84) 
0.0003 
(0.84) 
0.0003 
(0.90) 
Log of Maturity in 
Years  
+ -0.0002 
(-0.61)  
-0.0002 
(-0.61)  
-0.0002 
(-0.62)  
-0.0002 
(-0.61)  
-0.0002 
(-0.61)  
-0.0002 
(-0.88)  
Log of Loan Size  - -0.0004 
(-3.56) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0004 
(-3.57) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0004 
(-3.56) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0004 
(-3.56) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0004 
(-3.56) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0003 
(-3.29) ∗∗∗ 
Week –5 
 
+ 0.0001 
(0.30)  
     
Week –4 
 
+  -0.0004 
(-1.57)  
    
Week –3 
 
+   0.0001 
(0.43) 
   
Week –2 
 
+    -0.0001 
(-0.47)  
  
Week –1 + 
 
    -0.0000 
(-0.18) 
 
Week 0 + 
 
     -0.0002 
(0.73) 
Observations  6003 6003 6003 6003 6003 6003 
Adjusted R2  0.0031 0.0035 0.0031 0.0031 0.0031 0.0032 
Notes: This table reports regression results for testing the information content of quarterly earnings on 
syndicated loan returns using pooled cross-sectional, time-series ordinary least squares for good/bad news 
firms over –5 to 0 weeks of each quarterly earnings announcement during 1998-2002 period, respectively. 
Good/Bad news firms are defined as whether change in quarterly earnings for the same quarter from year 
t-1 to year t is no less than/less than zero. Rit is the weekly return on syndicated loan facility i in week t. 
MRt is return on S&P syndicated loan index in week t. CEiq is the percentage change in quarterly earnings 
measured by changes in earnings for quarter q from the current year to the prior year for firm i. SIZEiq is 
firm size, measured by the market capitalization (in millions of dollars)at the beginning of quarter q for 
firm i. Intangiblei is an indicator variable that takes the value of one is firm i is in an intangible-intensive 
industry, and zero otherwise. RATINGi is an indicator variable coded into 1 through 7 to represent 
Moody’s senior debt ratings of Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B and lower than B on facility i. SPREADit is all-in 
spread, measured by the basis point spread over LIBOR, inclusive of all fees for facility i at week t. 
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NOQUOTESit is the total number of weekly quotes on facility i at week t. DISTRESSiq is distressed loan 
indicator that takes the value of one if the price of the loan is less than 80 at week –5 of earnings 
announcement at quarter q and zero otherwise. COVENANTi is an indicator variable that equals one if a 
loan has financial covenant and zero otherwise. SECUREDi equals one if a loan is secured and zero 
otherwise. MATUi measures the maturity of the loan in terms of the number of years from the loan 
origination to its maturity. LOANSIZEi is the size of the loan at its origination, it is expressed in thousands 
of dollars. Kit is a dummy variable that equal 1s if the observed loan return at week t of firm i is in K weeks 
prior to its quarterly earnings announcement date, and zero otherwise. Regression is repeated for K=[-5,0]. 
Regressions also contain year indicators. T-tests are in the parenthesis below the coefficient, and p-values 
are calculated using White’s standard errors. The superscript asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at or 
below the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively, based on a two-tailed (where sign is not predicted) or a one-
tailed (where sign is predicted) test of significance. 
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Table 4  
OLS Regressions of Weekly Syndicated Loan Returns in a Window of [-5,0] Weeks 
Around Quarterly Earnings Announcement Dates 
– Intangible vs. Tangible Firms 
 
Model: Rit = α + β1MRt + β2CEiq+ β3SIZEiq+ β4RATINGi + β5LSPREADit + β6NOQUOTEit   
                      +β7DISTRESSit + β8COVENANTi + β9SECUREDi  + β10MATUi  + β11LOANSIZEi          
                            +β12Kit + εit 
 
 
Panel A: Bad news and intangible firms 
 
 Predicted 
Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MR 
 
+ 0.0273 
(1.68) ∗ 
0.0293 
(1.81) ∗ 
0.0321 
(1.94) ∗ 
0.0264 
(1.62)  
0.0278 
(1.71) ∗ 
0.0264 
(1.62)  
Percentage Change in 
Earnings 
+ 0.0001 
(2.01) ∗∗ 
0.0001 
(2.03) ∗∗ 
0.0001 
(1.86) ∗ 
0.0001 
(2.01) ∗∗ 
0.0001 
(2.01) ∗∗ 
0.0001 
(2.01) ∗∗ 
Log of Firm Size 
 
? 0.0000 
(0.10) 
0.0000 
(0.09) 
0.0000 
(0.15) 
0.0000 
(0.12) 
0.0000 
(0.12) 
0.0000 
(0.13) 
Loan Rate 
 
- -0.0013 
(-4.14) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0013 
(-4.11) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0013 
(-4.11) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0013 
(-4.17) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0013 
(-4.17) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0013 
(-4.14) ∗∗∗ 
Log of All-In Spread 
(Basis Points over 
LIBOR) 
? 0.0012 
(2.02) ∗∗ 
0.0012 
(1.99) ∗∗ 
0.0011 
(1.83) ∗ 
0.0012 
(2.02) ∗∗ 
0.0012 
(2.03) ∗∗ 
0.0012 
(2.02) ∗∗ 
Log of Number of 
Quotes 
- 
 
-0.0010 
(-2.24)∗∗ 
-0.0010 
(-2.29)∗∗ 
-0.0011 
(-2.39)∗∗ 
-0.0010 
(-2.23)∗∗ 
-0.0010 
(-2.24)∗∗ 
-0.0010 
(-2.26)∗∗ 
Distressed Loan 
Indicator 
- -0.0007 
(-1.45) 
 -0.0007 
(-1.41) 
-0.0010 
(-1.96) ∗ 
 -0.0007 
(-1.38) 
-0.0007 
(-1.37) 
 -0.0007 
(-1.38) 
Financial Covenants 
Indicator 
- 0.0053 
(3.52) ∗∗∗ 
0.0053 
(3.55) ∗∗∗ 
0.0052 
(3.41) ∗∗∗ 
0.0053 
(3.53) ∗∗∗ 
0.0053 
(3.53) ∗∗∗ 
0.0054 
(3.56) ∗∗∗ 
Secured Loan 
Indicator 
+ 
 
0.0004 
(0.28) 
0.0004 
(0.28) 
0.0000 
(0.02) 
0.0004 
(0.27) 
0.0004 
(0.27) 
0.0004 
(0.27) 
Log of Maturity in 
Years  
+  -0.0000 
(-0.03) 
 -0.0000 
(-0.01) 
 -0.0003 
(-0.28) 
 -0.0001 
(-0.05) 
 -0.0001 
(-0.05) 
 -0.0001 
(-0.06) 
Log of Loan Size  - -0.0002 
(-0.50)  
-0.0002 
(-0.50)  
-0.0002 
(-0.49)  
-0.0002 
(-0.50)  
-0.0002 
(-0.51)  
-0.0002 
(-0.51)  
Week –5 
 
- -0.0007 
(-0.90) 
     
Week –4 
 
-  -0.0028 
(-3.67) ∗∗∗ 
    
Week –3 
 
-   -0.0021 
(-2.82) ∗∗∗ 
   
Week –2 
 
-    -0.0010 
(-1.47) 
  
Week –1 - 
 
    -0.0006 
(-0.80) 
 
Week 0 - 
 
     0.0013 
(0.69) 
Observations  1798 1798 1798 1798 1798 1798 
Adjusted R2  0.0476 0.0544 0.0520 0.0483 0.0475 0.0490 
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Panel B: Bad news and tangible firms 
 
 Predicted  
Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MR 
 
+ 0.0023 
(0.38) 
0.0017 
(0.27) 
0.0016 
(0.27) 
0.0016 
(0.27) 
0.0018 
(0.29) 
0.0016 
(0.26) 
Percentage Change in 
Earnings 
+ 0.0000 
(0.07) 
0.0000 
(0.05) 
0.0000 
(0.03) 
0.0000 
(0.04) 
0.0000 
(0.04) 
0.0000 
(0.02) 
Log of Firm Size 
 
? -0.0001 
(-1.39)  
-0.0001 
(-1.43)  
-0.0001 
(-1.48)  
-0.0001 
(-1.48)  
-0.0001 
(-1.49)  
-0.0001 
(-1.48)  
Loan Rate 
 
- -0.0000 
(-0.20) 
-0.0000 
(-0.08) 
-0.0000 
(-0.13) 
-0.0000 
(-0.13) 
-0.0000 
(-0.13) 
-0.0000 
(-0.13) 
Log of All-In Spread 
(Basis Points over 
LIBOR) 
? -0.0006 
(-2.57)∗∗  
-0.0005 
(-2.06)∗∗  
-0.0006 
(-2.53)∗∗  
-0.0006 
(-2.53)∗∗  
-0.0006 
(-2.53)∗∗  
-0.0005 
(-2.52)∗∗  
Log of Number of 
Quotes 
- 
 
-0.0004 
(-2.65)∗∗ 
-0.0004 
(-2.45)∗∗ 
-0.0005 
(-2.69)∗∗ 
-0.0005 
(-2.68)∗∗ 
-0.0005 
(-2.68)∗∗ 
-0.0004 
(-2.68)∗∗ 
Distressed Loan 
Indicator 
- 0.0000 
(0.18) 
0.0000 
(0.23) 
0.0001 
(0.53) 
0.0001 
(0.52) 
0.0001 
(0.53) 
0.0000 
(0.51) 
Financial Covenants 
Indicator 
- -0.0004 
(-1.85) ∗  
-0.0003 
(-1.68) ∗  
-0.0004 
(-1.86) ∗  
-0.0004 
(-1.85) ∗  
-0.0004 
(-1.85) ∗  
-0.0004 
(-1.85) ∗  
Secured Loan 
Indicator 
+ 0.0004 
(1.08) 
0.0003 
(0.93) (1.06) 
0.0003 
(1.06) 
0.0003 
(1.06) 
0.0003 
(1.05) 
Log of Maturity in 
Years  
+ 0.0008 
(2.93) ∗∗∗ 
0.0007 
(2.85)∗∗∗ 
0.0008 
(2.98)∗∗∗ 
0.0008 
(2.97)∗∗∗ 
0.0008 
(2.97)∗∗∗ 
0.0008 
(2.97)∗∗∗ 
Log of Loan Size  - -0.0001 
(-0.79)  
-0.0001 
(-0.88)  
-0.0001 
(-0.82)  
-0.0001 
(-0.82)  
-0.0001 
(-0.82)  
-0.0001 
(-0.83)  
Week –5 
 
- -0.0003 
(-1.06)  
     
Week –4 
 
-  -0.001 
(-1.42) ∗∗ 
    
Week –3 
 
-   0.0001 
(0.49) 
   
Week –2 
 
-    -0.0001 
(-0.25) 
  
Week –1 - 
 
    0.0001 
(0.56) 
 
Week 0 - 
 
     -0.0003 
(-1.21) 
Observations  3233 3233 3233 3233 3233 3233 
Adjusted R2  0.0077 0.0074 0.0078 0.0077 0.0078 0.0081 
0.0003 
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Panel C: Good news and intangible firms 
 
 Predicted  
Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MR 
 
+ 0.0321 
(1.43) 
0.0325 
(1.45) 
0.0318 
(1.41) 
0.0341 
(1.52) 
0.0317 
(1.41) 
0.0320 
(1.42) 
Percentage Change in 
Earnings 
+ 0.0000 
(0.04)  
0.0000 
(0.06)  
0.0000 
(0.05)  
0.0000 
(0.06)  
0.0000 
(0.05)  
0.0000 
(0.05)  
Log of Firm Size 
 
? -0.0001 
(-0.90) 
-0.0001 
(-0.90) 
-0.0001 
(-0.92) 
-0.0001 
(-0.91) 
-0.0001 
(-0.91) 
-0.0001 
(-0.91) 
Loan Rate 
 
- -0.0005 
(-1.41)  
-0.0005 
(-1.40)  
-0.0005 
(-1.44)  
-0.0005 
(-1.40)  
-0.0005 
(-1.43)  
-0.0005 
(-1.43)  
Log of All-In Spread 
(Basis Points over 
LIBOR) 
? -0.0003 
(-0.49) 
-0.0003 
(-0.50) 
-0.0003 
(-0.49) 
-0.0003 
(-0.48) 
-0.0003 
(-0.49) 
-0.0003 
(-0.50) 
Log of Number of 
Quotes 
- 
 
-0.0005 
(-0.92) 
-0.0005 
(-0.92) 
-0.0005 
(-0.93) 
-0.0005 
(-0.92) 
-0.0005 
(-0.92) 
-0.0005 
(-0.92) 
Distressed Loan 
Indicator 
-  0.0004 
(0.66) 
 0.0005 
(0.69) 
 0.0005 
(0.74) 
 0.0005 
(0.70) 
 0.0005 
(0.74) 
 0.0005 
(0.74) 
Financial Covenants 
Indicator 
+ -0.0008 
(-0.60) 
-0.0008 
(-0.61) 
-0.0008 
(-0.60) 
-0.0008 
(-0.61) 
-0.0008 
(-0.60) 
-0.0008 
(-0.60) 
Secured Loan 
Indicator 
+ 0.0018 
(1.08) 
0.0018 
(1.08) 
0.0018 
(1.09) 
0.0018 
(1.07) 
0.0018 
(1.07) 
0.0018 
(1.08) 
Log of Maturity in 
Years  
+ 0.0000 
(0.01) 
0.0000 
(0.01) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
0.0000 
(0.01) 
0.0000 
(0.01) 
0.0000 
(0.01) 
Log of Loan Size  - -0.0001 
(-0.25)  
-0.0001 
(-0.25)  
-0.0001 
(-0.25)  
-0.0001 
(-0.24)  
-0.0001 
(-0.26)  
-0.0001 
(-0.25)  
Week –5 
 
+ -0.0009 
(-0.99)  
     
Week –4 
 
+  -0.0017 
(-1.36)  
    
Week –3 
 
+   0.0006 
(0.70) 
   
Week –2 
 
+    -0.0026 
(-1.00)  
  
Week –1 + 
 
    0.0003 
(0.32) 
 
Week 0 + 
 
     0.0004 
(0.42) 
Observations  1646 1646 1646 1646 1646 1646 
Adjusted R2  0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
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Panel D: Good news and tangible firms 
 
 
 Predicted  
Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MR 
 
+ 0.0109 
(0.91) 
0.0097 
(0.82) 
0.0107 
(0.90) 
0.0108 
(0.91) 
0.0108 
(0.91) 
0.0108 
(0.91) 
Percentage Change in 
Earnings 
+ 0.0000 
(0.23)  
0.0000 
(0.21)  
0.0000 
(0.23)  
0.0000 
(0.23)  
0.0000 
(0.23)  
0.0000 
(0.23)  
Log of Firm Size 
 
? 0.0004 
(2.35) ∗∗ 
0.0004 
(2.35) ∗∗ 
0.0004 
(2.35) ∗∗ 
0.0004 
(2.35) ∗∗ 
0.0004 
(2.35) ∗∗ 
0.0004 
(2.35) ∗∗ 
Loan Rate 
 
- -0.0003 
(-1.62)  
-0.0003 
(-1.62)  
-0.0003 
(-1.63)  
-0.0003 
(-1.62)  
-0.0003 
(-1.62)  
-0.0003 
(-1.62)  
Log of All-In Spread 
(Basis Points over 
LIBOR) 
? 0.0003 
(0.51) 
0.0003 
(0.51) 
0.0003 
(0.52) 
0.0003 
(0.51) 
0.0003 
(0.51) 
0.0003 
(0.51) 
Log of Number of 
Quotes 
- 
 
-0.0005 
(-1.93) ∗ 
-0.0006 
(-1.95) ∗ 
-0.0006 
(-1.94) ∗ 
-0.0006 
(-1.94) ∗ 
-0.0006 
(-1.93) ∗ 
-0.0006 
(-1.93) ∗ 
Distressed Loan 
Indicator 
-  -0.0013 
(-3.28) ∗∗∗ 
 -0.0014 
(-3.48) ∗∗∗ 
 -0.0013 
(-3.33) ∗∗∗ 
 -0.0013 
(-3.33) ∗∗∗ 
 -0.0013 
(-3.34) ∗∗∗ 
 -0.0013 
(-3.34) ∗∗∗ 
Financial Covenants 
Indicator 
+ 0.0007 
(1.76) ∗ 
0.0007 
(1.77) ∗ 
0.0007 
(1.76) ∗ 
0.0007 
(1.76) ∗ 
0.0007 
(1.76) ∗ 
0.0007 
(1.76) ∗ 
Secured Loan 
Indicator 
+ 0.0012 
(1.90) ∗ 
0.0013 
(1.90) ∗ 
0.0012 
(1.90) ∗ 
0.0013 
(1.90) ∗ 
0.0013 
(1.90) ∗ 
0.0013 
(1.90) ∗ 
Log of Maturity in 
Years  
+ 0.0010 
(1.90) ∗ 
0.0011 
(1.92) ∗ 
0.0010 
(1.90) ∗ 
0.0010 
(1.91) ∗ 
0.0010 
(1.91) ∗ 
0.0010 
(1.91) ∗ 
Log of Loan Size  - -0.0005 
(-2.02) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0005 
(-2.02) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0005 
(-2.01) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0005 
(-2.01) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0005 
(-2.02) ∗∗∗ 
-0.0005 
(-2.02) ∗∗∗ 
Week –5 
 
+ 0.0002 
(0.36)  
     
Week –4 
 
+  -0.014 
(-1.60)  
    
Week –3 
 
+   0.0003 
(0.66) 
   
Week –2 
 
+    0.0002 
(0.41)  
  
Week –1 + 
 
    0.0000 
(0.07) 
 
Week 0 + 
 
     0.0001 
(0.23) 
Observations  4357 4357 4357 4357 4357 4357 
Adjusted R2  0.0131 0.0147 0.0132 0.0131 0.0131 0.0131 
Notes: This table reports regression results for testing the information content of quarterly earnings on 
syndicated loan returns using pooled cross-sectional, time-series ordinary least squares for bad/good news 
and intangible, bad/good news and tangible firms over –5 to 0 weeks of each quarterly earnings 
announcement during 1998-2002 period, respectively. Good/Bad news firms are defined as whether 
change in quarterly earnings for the same quarter from year t-1 to year t is no less than/less than zero. 
Intangible/tangible is classified by whether the firm is in an intangible-intensive industry or not. Rit is the 
weekly return on syndicated loan facility i in week t. MRt is return on S&P syndicated loan index in week 
t. CEiq is the percentage change in quarterly earnings measured by changes in earnings for quarter q from 
the current year to the prior year for firm i.  SIZEiq is firm size, measured by the market capitalization (in 
millions of dollars)at the beginning of quarter q for firm i. RATINGi is an indicator variable coded into 1 
through 7 to represent Moody’s senior debt ratings of Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B and lower than B on facility 
i. SPREADit is all-in spread, measured by the basis point spread over LIBOR, inclusive of all fees for 
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facility i at week t. NOQUOTESit is the total number of weekly quotes on facility i at week t. DISTRESSiq 
is distressed loan indicator that takes the value of one if the price of the loan is less than 80 at week –5 of 
earnings announcement at quarter q and zero otherwise. COVENANTi is an indicator variable that equals 
one if a loan has financial covenant and zero otherwise. SECUREDi equals one if a loan is secured and 
zero otherwise. MATUi measures the maturity of the loan in terms of the number of years from the loan 
origination to its maturity. LOANSIZEi is the size of the loan at its origination, it is expressed in thousands 
of dollars. Kit is a dummy variable that equal 1s if the observed loan return at week t of firm i is in K weeks 
prior to its quarterly earnings announcement date, and zero otherwise. Regression is repeated for K=[-5,0]. 
Regressions also contain year indicators. T-tests are in the parenthesis below the coefficient, and p-values 
are calculated using White’s standard errors. The superscript asterisks *, **, *** denotes significance at or 
below the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level, respectively, based on a two-tailed (where sign is not predicted) or a one-
tailed (where sign is predicted) test of significance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
